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This paper attempts to investigate the relation between pyramidal structure and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) reporting quality and the effect of political interference on the relation. Based on 1388 Chinese A-share listed 
firms during 2010-2012, this paper demonstrates that the separation between control and ownership rights is 
significantly and positively related to the CSR reporting quality in the state-owned firms (SOFs), while negatively 
related to the CSR reporting quality in the non-state-owned firms (NSOFs). Results also indicate that the pyramidal 
layer between the bottom firms and their top ultimate owners is negatively related to CSR reporting quality, 
particularly significant for the NSOFs. Our research enriches the corporate governance literature by giving insights 
into the mechanism of pyramidal structure in corporate reporting, and extends the understanding of political 
interference in the CSR field. This study has public policy implications for China as well as a number of other 
countries in the Asia–Pacific region.  
 




1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
orporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting has been a mainstream global business practice over the 
past decades. A survey of CSR reports by KPMG International indicates that nearly 93% of the largest 
250 firms in the world issued standalone CSR reports in 2013, and almost three quarters of the 100 
largest companies surveyed in 41 countries publishing the CSR reports. This survey also indicated that Asia Pacific 
region has demonstrated a dramatic increase in CSR reporting rates over the past few years, as a result of the 
introduction of government regulation or guidelines from stock exchanges and other organizations. With the 
increase in the number of CSR reports, however, a concern for the low quality of CSR reporting has attracted a 
widespread attention (KPMG International, 2013; China WTO Tribune, 2009). 
 
Prior literature extensively explores the cultural and institutional factors that potentially influence the firms’ 
attitudes and actions in disclosing corporate social information (Buhr and Freedman, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005). By comparing the environmental disclosure by Canadian and US firms, Buhr and Freedman (2001) find that 
the collectivistic nature of Canadian society is more likely to induce the voluntary environmental reports, while the 
litigious nature of US leads to produce more of the mandated reports. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) emphasize the 
impact of corporate governance on the corporate social disclosure of Malaysian companies, especially the board 
characteristics. They demonstrate a significant relationship between corporate social disclosure and different board 
structures such as boards dominated by Malay directors, boards dominated by executive directors, and boards 
chaired with multiple directorships. In addition, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) also provide evidence on the effect of the 
foreign share ownership on the CSR disclosure. Coincidently, Aguilear et al. (2006) investigate the role of another 
salient type of owner, institutional investors, in emphasizing the firm-level CSR actions. They find that the 
difference between the UK and US firms in the CSR field results from the differences in the composition of 
C 
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institutional investors. These findings have at least two implications: 1), the corporate governance arrangement is an 
important aspect that influences the corporate disclosure; 2), the corporate owner could affect the attitudes and 
actions that firms take in CSR. Therefore, by taking the perspective of corporate governance, this paper attempts to 
investigate the potential reasons why the quality of CSR reporting in Asia Pacific region is low.  
 
We take the emerging Chinese market as our empirical research context for the following three reasons. Firstly, 
China is the largest developing economic body in Asia. Previous research mostly focuses on CSR report in the 
developed countries such as US, UK and other European countries (Holder-Webb et al. 2009; Mahoney et al. 2013), 
little attention has been given to the CSR in Asian countries. Our study would be helpful to understand the current 
status of CSR reporting in this region. Secondly, there are similar driving forces for CSR reporting between China 
and other Asian countries. CSR reporting is significantly driven by the government in most Asian countries (KPMG, 
2013). For instance, the Chinese Stock Regulatory Commission (CSRC) made the CSR report a mandatory 
requirement for some listed firms in 2008. Triggered by such mandatory disclosure initiation, the number of Chinese 
listed firms issuing CSR reports jumped from only 21 in 2006 to 371 in 2009. After Malaysian Stock Exchange 
requires that listed firms report on CSR activities, the percentage of firms that report CSR increases from almost 
zero in 2011 to 98% in 2013. In Singapore, the introduction of the Singapore Stock Exchange Sustainability 
Reporting Guide for listed firms has led to a 37 percentage point increase in CSR reporting rate. Lastly, there is a 
large similarity between China and other Asian countries with regard to the corporate governance and institutional 
environment. For example, the corporate ownership is highly concentrated, and a majority of firms are controlled by 
the state in a number of Asian countries (Fan and Wong, 2002), representing a highly political interference on 
corporate governance. Claessens et al. (2000) also indicates that there are 23.6% firms in Singapore, 18.2% in 
Malaysia and 63.15% in China having the state as ultimate owner respectively, much higher than the percentage in 
the other countries (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Li and Zhang, 2010). More importantly, Asian firms usually build 
complicated pyramidal structure to exert their control (Fan and Wong, 2002; Fan et al., 2012). And hence, by using 
1388 Chinese listed A-share firms that issued their standalone CSR reports during the period of 2010-2012, this 
paper investigates the potential effect of widespread pyramidal structure on CSR reporting disclosure, and the effect 
of government political interference on the relationship. Our results would have policy implications for China and 
other Asian countries with similar governance and political environment. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this study directly examines the effect of pyramidal 
structure on CSR reporting quality in an attempt to deeply understand the relation between corporate governance 
and non-financial information quality. CSR reporting has been regarded as the most important source of non-
financial information for investors (Eurosif and ACCA, 2013). Our results are helpful to understand the mechanism 
how corporate ownership structure influences CSR information quality. Second, this paper provides evidence on the 
different characteristics of pyramidal structure between state-owned firms (SOFs) and non-state-owned firms 
(NSOFs) and examines the effect of political interference on corporate disclosure quality. The earlier literature 
mostly pays attention to the pyramidal structure across East Asia, particularly the family controlled firms (Claessens 
et al. 2000, Fan and Wong 2002). However, evidence indicates that quite a lot of Asian firms are controlled directly 
or indirectly by the state, which has a different purpose of pyramiding from the NSOFs (Fan et al., 2005). Li and 
Zhang (2010) demonstrate an opposite effect of ownership dispersion on CSR level between SOFs and NSOFs. This 
paper provides further evidence on how politically interfered pyramid structure affect corporate information quality. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review relevant literature and develop the hypotheses. 
Section 3 outlines the study design and research methodology. Section 4 presents empirical results and their 
interpretations. Section 5 concludes the paper with a description of its implications. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
Corporate governance, the system by which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury Code, 1992), has been 
used to explain differences in finance and the role of the market for corporate control. Due to the divergence of 
political, social and cultural environment, however, the divergent corporate governance of different countries can 
further influence and determine the modes of CSR practices. Aguilera et al. (2006) compared the corporate 
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governance and CSR practices in the UK and US, and found that some salient differences exist between the 
corporate governance in the US and UK. For example, the composition of institutional investors in these two nations 
was different. Insurance companies and pension funds predominated in the UK, while investment companies and 
mutual funds were the largest institutional investors in the US. Because different investors have significantly 
different performance strategies, they could offer distinct pressures on the firm and its stakeholders and hence 
influence the attitude to the CSR practices. Compared with the US investors, the institutional investors in the UK 
with a longer-term perspective are more likely to see a company’s social and environmental behavior as material to 
investment decisions (Aguilera et al., 2006). Therefore, the corporate governance, in particular the ownership 
structure, is a key to influence and determine the firm’s attitude to the CSR practices. 
 
The majority of existing literature of ownership structure focuses on immediate ownership - common stocks directly 
owned by individuals or organizations. However, the body of corporate governance literature provides evidence that 
East Asian firms are generally associated with complicated indirect ownership- pyramidal ownership structure 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002), which is an important mechanism used by the ultimate owners to 
separate their cash flow ownership from their control rights, with a purpose of obtaining more interests deriving 
from more control rights (La Porta et al. 1999). Some research investigates the potential effect of pyramidal 
structure on firm performance (Fan et al., 2005; 2007), and financial information quality (Fan and Wong, 2002; Zhu, 
2006). However, little attention has been given on the relations between pyramidal structure and CSR reporting. 
Being one of the most important parts of corporate information, CSR report can help stakeholders know what the 
firms have done, signaling their good performance to the stakeholders and reducing the degree of information 
asymmetry between stakeholders and corporate management (Hendarto and Purwanto, 2012). And hence, we 
investigate the potential influence of pyramidal structure on CSR reporting quality. Specifically, we try to study two 
questions. The first is the relation between pyramidal layers and CSR information quality. The second is the relation 
between the control-ownership rights separation and CSR information quality. 
 
In addition, as mentioned earlier, a number of East Asian firms are controlled by the state ultimately. Due to the 
different property constraints between the state and the individual owners, however, their purpose of pyramiding is 
divergent (Fan et al., 2005). The state uses pyramiding to credibly decentralize their firm control rights to firm 
management without selling off their ownership, while the individual owners use pyramiding to create internal 
capital markets that help relieving their external financing constraints. Li and Zhang (2010) also provide empirical 
evidence that SOFs and NSOFs have a wholly different attitude to the CSR practice. In the meanwhile, the 
motivation to publish information is also different between the NSOFs and SOFs. In the NSOFs, the motivation to 
publish information is weak except for mandatory regulation (Chau and Gray, 2002). Nevertheless, SOFs are willing 
to provide related information through CSR reporting to signal their good deeds (Ghazali, 2007; Wang et al., 2012), 
because these firms may be set up not only to achieve profit maximization, but also to fulfill a range of social 
objectives. Thus, we further divide the two arguments pertaining to the relations between the pyramidal ownership 
structures and CSR reporting quality, and investigate them in the state-owned firms and non-state-owned firms 
respectively to observe the influence of political interference on the relations.  
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
Pyramidal structure refers to “the sort of corporate ownership structure through which the ultimate owner establishes 
control over several layers of firms via a very small capital investment” (Zhu, 2009). In a pyramid-like corporate 
structure, the number of intermediate pyramidal layers between the bottom firm and its top ultimate owner 
represents the extent of a pyramidal structure. In the simplest circumstance, the intermediate pyramidal layer 
between the bottom firm and its top ultimate owner is only one - both the equity ownership and control rights are 
directly held by the controlling shareholder, who faces the same agency problem and have the same need to get 
information from the bottom firms as the other non-controlling shareholders. When the number of pyramidal layers 
increases between the bottom firm and its top ultimate owner, however, the firm will be controlled by the ultimate 
owner rather than the controlling shareholder, which reduces the controlling shareholder’s motivation to regulate the 
bottom firms. The more layers in a pyramidal structure, the more serious the agency problems are. For the non-state-
owned firms, the main purpose of pyramiding is to build an internal financing market (Fan et al., 2005) to fill in the 
financing gap. Because of the absence of strong desire to attract social attention to get their needed fund, the NSOFs 
would not have motive to disclose CSR information voluntarily. Moreover, the ultimate owner of NSOFs may find it 
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advantageous to restrain the extent of information disclosure in order to achieve its self-serving interests, which 
ultimately leads to a lower transparent information disclosure. And thus, we expect that the pyramidal layer is 
negatively related to the CSR reporting quality for the non-state-owned firms. 
 
However, the situation has changed due to the government intervention. First, for the state-owned firms, the purpose 
of pyramiding is to help them to decentralize their firm decision rights to firm management without selling off their 
ownership (Fan et al., 2005), and the high bureaucratic costs associated with the pyramids deter ex-post intervention 
by the government (Williamson, 1985), it is thus expected that, with the increase of pyramidal layers, the managers 
of SOFs tend to have more discretion to determine the quality of their corporate reports. The abundant resource and 
political legitimacy might make SOFs having the least need to use CSR reporting to seek preferred status and 
associated resources from the government (Ma and Parish, 2006; Li and Zhang, 2007; Marquis and Qian, 2014). 
However, the executives of SOFs concurrently hold the administrative position in the government departments and 
bureaus (Fan et al., 2007). Given the government control on the political promotion and personal dismissal, the 
executives of SOFs with administrative position would have strong political incentives to publish CSR reporting in a 
substantive way to satisfy with the government requirement. Marquis and Qian (2014) provide evidence that firms 
whose leaders hold positions as government officials are more likely to engage in high quality CSR reporting, 
mitigating the relevance of pyramidal layers to the CSR reporting. Due to the multiple functions that state-owned 
firms play in the social and economic life, the effect of pyramidal layer on the reporting quality is unclear. Thus, we 
posit the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: For the non-state-owned firms, CSR reporting quality is negatively associated with the number of pyramid 
layers. 
 
H1b: For the state-owned firms, the relationship between CSR reporting quality and number of pyramid layer is 
unclear. 
 
The pyramidal structure also creates a separation in control rights and ownership stake, which allows the top owners 
to commit low equity investment while maintaining tight control of the firm. When an owner effectively controls a 
firm, he/she also controls the production of the firm’s information and reporting policies. Fan and Wong (2002) 
argues that when the ultimate owner becomes entrenched with high levels of control, outside investors pay less 
attention to the reported accounting information because they anticipate that the controlling owner reports 
accounting information out of self-interest rather than as a reflection of the firm’s true underlying economic 
transaction. Thus, accounting informativeness is significantly and negatively related to the degree of divergence 
between the ultimate owner’s control and the equity ownership level. Due to the externality of CSR, with the 
increase in the degree of separation between the ultimate owner’s control rights and ownership rights, the ultimate 
owner of NSOFs would limit the bottom firm to invest in CSR activities and report CSR information out of self-
interest.  
 
For the state-owned firms with the exclusive political connection with the government, however, they have better 
access to resources which help them to engage CSR activities and prepare CSR reporting in a substantive way. In 
addition, CSR reporting is a political signal that is utilized by the government to create norms of legitimacy (Dobbin 
and Sutton, 1998; Marquis and Qian, 2014). The ultimate state owner may use their exceeding control rights to 
guide the bottom firm to report better CSR reports in response to the government signal. Thus, we posit the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H2a: For the non-state-owned firms, CSR reporting quality is negatively related to the degree of control-ownership 
rights separation. 
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3.   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
 
Our initial sample consists of all Chinese listed A-share firms that received a CSR reporting quality score during 
2010-2012 from the Rankins (RKS) Inc., a private and professional China-specific CSR rating agency established in 
Beijing. Rankins evaluates CSR reporting quality by using Structured Experts Scoring Method to conduct a 
comprehensive evaluation from the following four dimensions: macrocosm (M, 30%), content (C, 45%), technique 
(T, 15%), and industry characteristic (I, 10%). The total of M, C, T and I dimension is the final score, which ranges 
from 0 to 100. The higher score, the higher the CSR reporting quality is. In addition, the RKS database also provides 
a CSR report rating rank ranging from the lowest (C) to the highest (AAA) level. Each level can be marginally 
adjusted by using “-” and “+” except the AAA and CCC and lower levels. We numbered the lowest level “C” as “1”, 
“CC” as “2, up to the highest “AAA” as “20”. Thus, we use rating score and reporting rank as the proxies of 
dependent variable reporting quality (CSRR), respectively.  
 
We firstly exclude firms listed on the Growth Enterprises Market (GEM) due to the particularity of the regulation on 
these firms. Secondly, we exclude firms falling in the finance industry due to the regulation and the particularity of 
operation. We then manually collect the ownership structure information from the annual reports of sample firms, 
which are available from the official websites of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (http://www.sse.com.cn) and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (http://www.szse.cn). Our final sample consists of 1388 reports after excluding the 
sample firms that have missing value.  
 
Table 1. Sample Industry Distribution 
Industry 
2010 2011 2012 Sub-Total 
N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting 5 (1.18) 8 (1.75) 9 (1.76) 22 (1.59) 
Mining 26 (6.16) 24 (5.26) 29 (5.69) 79 (5.69) 
Food & Beverage 15 (3.55) 14 (3.07) 21 (4.12) 50 (3.60) 
Textile, Apparel & Leather 10 (2.37) 12 (2.63) 15 (2.94) 37 (2.66) 
Paper &Printing 9 (2.13) 8 (1.75) 11 (2.16) 28 (2.02) 
Petroleum, Chemicals, Plastics &Rubber 30 (7.11) 32 (7.02) 39 (7.65) 101 (7.28) 
Electrical Equipment 17 (4.03) 18 (3.95) 18 (3.53) 53 (3.82) 
Metal, Nonmetallic Mineral Product 45 (10.66) 49 (10.75) 54 (10.59) 148 (10.66) 
Machinery, Equipment &Meter 63 (14.93) 72 (15.79) 82 (16.08) 217 (15.63) 
Pharmacy, Biology Product 25 (5.92) 26 (5.70) 27 (5.29) 78 (5.62) 
Other Machinery 5 (1.18) 5 (1.10) 5 (0.98) 15 (1.08) 
Electricity, Gas &Water Supply 23 (5.45) 24 (5.26) 26 (5.10) 73 (5.26) 
Construction 13 (3.08) 13 (2.85) 15 (2.94) 41 (2.95) 
Transport Storage 31 (7.35) 35 (7.68) 36 (7.06) 102 (7.35) 
Information Technology 26 (6.16) 31 (6.80) 31 (6.08) 88 (6.34) 
Wholesale& Retail  21 (4.98) 25 (5.48) 26 (5.10) 72 (5.19) 
Real Estate 28 (6.64) 29 (6.36) 37 (7.25) 94 (6.77) 
Social Service 7 (1.66) 8 (1.75) 10 (1.96) 25 (1.80) 
Communication& Culture  4 (0.95) 4 (0.88) 3 (0.59) 11 (0.79) 
Conglomerate 19 (4.50) 19 (4.17) 16 (3.14) 54 (3.89) 
Total 422  456  510  1388  
 
Table 1 presents the sample industry distribution. According to the CSRC industry classification (2001 Edition), 
there are 20 industries covered in this study. The Machinery, Equipment, and Meter industry provided the largest 
population of CSR reports with a total of 217 and accounts for 15.63% of all sample firms. The Metal, Nonmetallic 
Mineral Product industry follows with a percentage of 10.66%. The Communication & Culture industry provides the 
fewest reports with a total of 11 in four years, which accounts for only 0.79% of all reports. In addition, Table 1 also 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 708 The Clute Institute 
indicates that firms issuing CSR reports have increased steadily during the whole sample period, from 422 in 2010 




3.2.1 Explanatory Variables 
 
We consider two basic explanatory variables related to the pyramidal structure: pyramidal layer, and the degree of 
separation between control and ownership rights. Pyramidal layer (LAYER) is a numerical variable represented by 
the number of intermediate layers between the top ultimate owner and the bottom firm i in a pyramid. The control-
ownership right separation (CO) refers to the ratio of ownership over control rights of the largest ultimate owner of 
firm i. Among them, control right (C) is represented by the minimum of the shareholding percentage on the 
pyramidal chain between the top ultimate owner and the bottom firm i. Ownership right (O) is represented by the 
ownership belonging to the top ultimate owner of firm i. All data related to the pyramidal structure are manually 
collected from the annual reports of sample firms. 
 
3.2.2 Control Variables 
 
Based on an extensive review of prior research, we select control variables that have been widely used in the CSR 
information disclosure field, including firm and industry characteristics and regulation environment (Cowen et al., 
1987; Roberts, 1992; Gray et al., 2001; Cormier and Magnan, 2003; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Cormier et al., 2005; 
Li and Zhang, 2010). We first take firm characteristics such as ownership concentration, firm size, performance and 
financial risk as control variables. Ownership concentration (OWN) is measured as the ownership right held by the 
largest shareholder (Li and Zhang, 2010). Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets at 
prior year-end (Cowen et al., 1987; Roberts, 1992; Cormier and Magnan, 2003). Performance (ROA) is measured by 
return on assets at prior year-end (Cowen et al., 1987; Gray et al., 2001). Debt ratio is employed to proxy for 
financial risk (DEBT), and measured by the ratio of “total debt to total assets” at prior year-end (Roberts, 1992). 
Next, we select two dummy variables to reflect the regulation environment. The first one is mandatory regulation 
variable (REG), taking the value of “1”if firm i is a member falling in the mandatory disclosure group in year t, and 
“0” otherwise. Gray et al. (2001) argues that the failure to distinguish between mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
is a main reason that leads to an inconsistent result of prior studies. Further considering the potentially regulatory 
difference between Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Shanghai Stock Exchanges (SSE), we select the second 
dummy variable Exchange (EXC), taking the value of “1”if firm i is listed on the SSE, and “0” otherwise. Last, 
following the previous research, we use two dummy variables to control for the potential influence of disclosure 
period, and use 19 dummy variables to capture the potential impact of different industries on CSR reporting quality 
(Cowen et al., 1987; Roberts, 1992). All data related to the financial statements and industry classifications are from 
the China Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The definition and measures of employed 
variables are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Definition Variables Measure 
CSR reporting quality  CSRR Rating score available from RKS database, and Rating rank available from RKS database 
Pyramidal layer LAYER The number of intermediate layers between the top ultimate owner and the bottom firm i in a pyramid 
Control-ownership right separation CO Ratio of ownership over control rights of the largest ultimate owner of firm i 
Ownership concentration OWN The ownership percentage held by the controlling shareholder 
Firm size SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at prior year-end 
Performance  ROA The ratio of net profit over total assets at prior year-end 
Financial risk DEBT The ratio of total debt to total assets at prior year-end 
Regulation REG Dummy variable, taking the value of “1”if firm i is a member falling in the mandatory group in year t, and “0” otherwise 
Exchange EXC dummy variable, taking the value of “1”if firm i is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and “0” otherwise 
Disclosure period Y2012 Y2011 
Two dummy variables to control for the potential influence of disclosure 
period, taking the value of “1” if firm i issues CSR reporting in 2012 and 
2011 respectively, and “0” otherwise 
Industry INDj 19 dummy variables to control for the potential influence of industry  
 
Equation (1) presents a generalized model for different specifications on the right hand side to test the proposed 
hypotheses: 
 
CSRRit =α + βit∑ ExplanatoryVariablesit + γ itControlVariablesit +ε∑  (1) 
 
where CSRRit refers to the CSR Reporting quality, measured as rating score and rating rank of firm i in year t, 
respectively; Explanatory Variables refers to the independent variables, including pyramidal layer (LAYER), and the 
degree of separation between control rights and ownership rights (CO); Control Variables refer to ownership 
concentration (OWN), firm size (SIZE), performance (ROA), financial risk (DEBT), regulation (REG), stock 
exchange (EXC), 2 variables labeled disclosure period, Y2012 and Y2011, and 19 industry dummy variables (INDj); 
and ε is the error term.  
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3 and 4 present the descriptive statistics of CSR reporting quality during three sample years. Panel A in Table 
3 shows an apparent increase in terms of the disclosure quality, ranging from 31.658 in 2010 to 35.987 in 2012, with 
a yearly average increase of 1.86 (mean) and 1.41 (median). Panel B in Table 3 reports that CSR reporting quality 
scores of state-owned firms with an average of 34.065 is higher than that of non-state-owned firms.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of CSR Reporting Quality Score 





Panel A: By year        
2010 31.658 11.164 11.69 78.49 24.645 28.575 34.813 
2011 33.702 12.808 13.33 80.29 25.145 30.175 38.025 
2012 35.987 12.541 15.12 81.88 28.033 32.480 39.495 
 
Panel B: By ultimate owner 
SOFs 34.065 12.377 13.33 80.29 25.893 30.650 37.345 
NSOFs 30.369 10.338 11.69 81.88 23.839 28.130 33.100 
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The descriptive results in Table 4 further indicate that the number of CSR reports with A and B higher level of 
quality has been increasing over the sample period. In particular, there is almost 20% rise in the B or higher level in 
2012. In Panel B, the percentage of firms with higher CSR reporting quality (A and B level) in the state-owned firms 
is obviously higher than that in non-state-owned firms. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of CSR Reporting Quality Rank 
Type A or higher B or higher C or higher Total 
Panel A: By year     
2010 21 (4.98%) 289 (68.48%) 112 (26.54%) 422 
2011 28 (6.14%) 283 (62.07%) 145 (31.79%) 456 
2012 30 (5.88%) 416 (81.57%) 64 (12.55%) 510 
 
Panel B: By ultimate owner 
SOFs 67 (7.17%) 688 (73.66%) 179 (19.16%) 934 
NSOFs 12 (2.64%) 300 (66.08%) 142 (31.28%) 454 
Notes: “A or higher” represents the CSR reporting rank belonging to A, AA and AAA and the levels marginally adjusted by using “-” and “+” for 
A, AA and AAA; the same as “B or higher” and “C or higher”.   
 
Table 5 reports the distribution of pyramidal layers of sample firms. Results indicate that nearly 70% of sample 
firms are controlled by the state, which shows that the government is still the dominant owner of firms in China. 
97% of sample firms have 2 or more layers between the top ultimate owner and the bottom firms, suggesting that the 
pyramid is a widespread ownership structure in China. In addition, for the state-owned firms, the percentage of firms 
having 2 layers accounts for the majority (56.85%), while the non-state-owned firms having 3 layers account for the 
most part (48.02%), and the percentage of firms having 4 or more layers of non-state-owned firms are higher than 
that of state-owned firms, suggesting that non-state-owned firms are more likely to build complicated pyramids than 
state-owned firms. 
 
Table 5. Pyramidal Layers of State-owned Firms and Non-state-owned Firms 
Type 
Number of pyramidal layers 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 or more 
SOFs N 28 531 273 76 26 934 
(%) (2.99) (56.85) (29.23 ) (8.14) (2.78) (100) 
NSOFs 
N 18 98 218 65 55 454 
(%) (3.96) (21.59) (48.02) (14.32) (12.11) (100) 
Total 
N 46 629 491 141 81 1388 
(%) (3.31) (45.32) (35.37) (10.16) (5.84) (100) 
Note: The number of pyramidal layers is defined to be one when an ultimate owner directly controls the listed firm, two when there is one 
intermediate firm between the top ultimate owner and the bottom firm, and so on. The number of pyramidal layers is counted from the longest 
controlling chain in case of multiple chains. 
 
Following Fan and Wong’s study (2002), we take 20% and 50% as the cutoff of control rights and ownership rights. 
Panel A in Table 6 reports the distribution of control rights falling in the three intervals (C<20%; 20%≤C<50%; 
50%≤C). Although both SOFs and NSOFs have the most falling in the middle interval, there is a difference on the 
attitude to the bottom and upper intervals. SOFs are more likely to have absolute control on bottom firms than 
NSOFs, but NSOFs have a higher percentage in the bottom interval than SOFs. Panel B presents the distribution of 
ownership rights, which shows a similar distribution trend to that in Panel A. Panel C provides further evidence on 
the divergence between control rights and ownership rights. Results indicate that nearly two thirds of the SOFs do 
not have divergence between control rights and ownership at all (CO=1). However, this percentage for the NSOFs is 
only 28.41%. Moreover, there are 24.22% of NSOFs with CO separation lower than 0.5, significantly higher than 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Control Rights, Ownership Rights and CO Separation 
Panel A: Control Right  
 C<20% 20%≤C<50% 50%≤C 
SOFs N 72 499 363 (%) (7.71) (53.43) (38.86) 
NSOFs N 88 264 102 (%) (19.38) (58.15) (22.47) 
Total N 160 763 465 (%) (11.53) (54.97) (33.50) 
 
Panel B: Ownership Right 
  O<20% 20%≤O<50% 50%≤O 
SOFs N 161 488 285 (%) (17.24) (52.25) (30.51) 
NSOFs N 194 206 54 (%) (42.73) (45.37) (11.89) 
Total N 355 694 339 (%) (25.58) (50.00) (24.42) 
 
Panel C: The Ratio of Ownership over Control Rights 
  CO<0.5 0.5≤CO<1 CO =1 
SOFs N 75 225 634 (%) (8.03) (24.09) (67.88) 
NSOFs N 109 216 129 (%) (24.01) (47.58) (28.41) 
Total N 184 441 763 (%) (13.26) (31.77) (54.97) 
Notes: Control right (C) is represented by the minimum of the shareholding percentage on the pyramidal chain between the top ultimate owner 
and the bottom firm i. Ownership right (O) is represented by the ownership belonging to the top ultimate owner of firm i. The control-ownership 
right separation (CO) refers to the ratio of ownership over control rights of the largest ultimate owner of firm i. 
 
Table 7 provides distributional characteristics for the variables employed in the study with the exception of the 
dummy variable proxies for industry and disclosure period. As shown in Table 7, CSR reporting score averages 
33.92 (out of a possible full score 100), with a median score of 30.73, which shows that CSR reporting quality of 
Chinese listed firms is relatively low. The average ownership concentration is approximately 41.34%, indicating a 
higher concentration of Chinese listed firms. The average pyramidal layer between listed firms and their ultimate 
owners is 2.73 with a median of 3, indicating that pyramidal structure is very popular in companies listed on the 
Chinese capital market, consistent with prior research (Fan et al. 2005). The mean value of CO is 0.83, a little larger 
divergence than that of East Asian firms in Fan and Wong’s study (2002).  
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Variables 
Variables Mean Median CSRR LAYER CO OWM SIZE ROA DEBT REG 
CSRR 33.92 30.73 1        
LAYER 2.73 3 -0.143*** 1       
CO 0.83 1 0.074*** -0.546*** 1      
OWN 41.34 41.49 0.216*** -0.051* 0.226*** 1     
SIZE 22.75 22.62 0.477*** -0.161*** 0.125*** 0.324*** 1    
ROA 0.07 0.06 0.064** 0.043 -0.074*** 0.065** -0.067** 1   
DEBT 0.51 0.52 0.046* -0.010 -0.001 0.013 0.429*** -0.403*** 1  
REG 0.72 1 0.115*** -0.070*** 0.002 0.010 0.365*** -0.043 0.153*** 1 
EXC 0.62 1 0.022 -0.014 -0.006 0.057** 0.174*** -0.146*** 0.158*** 0.376*** 
Notes: 1. CSRR in Table 7 is measured as rating score. Min refers to the minimum, and Max refers to the maximum. We also correlate the CSRR 
measured as Rating rank and other variables and results are consistent with those reported in Table 7. Due to the space limitation, we do not 
present the correlation results in the paper, but available from the authors upon request. 
2.  *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test. 
 
With respect to the control variables, the firm size averages 22.75 with a median 22.62, the average ROA of sample 
firms is approximately 7%, and the average debt ratio for sample firms is nearly 51%. 72% of CSR reports are 
subject to the mandatory disclosure requirement. The willingness of Chinese firms to disclose CSR voluntarily is 
still very low. There are 62% of sample firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
 
Table 7 also provides a correlation matrix for the dependent variable (measured as rating score), all independent 
variables and some control variables used in the study. Two selected independent variables are significantly related 
to the dependent variable CSRR. The highest correlation coefficient is 0.546 between pyramidal layer and control-
ownership right separation, lower than the critical value 0.8, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious issue. 
The correlations between the control variables are relatively weak (p≤0.40), except for the correlation between SIZE 
and DEBT (p=0.429), and DEBT and ROA (p=-0.403). We also checked for multicollinearity by looking at the 
VIFs (variance inflation factor). The VIFs are smaller than 2, mitigating the multicollinearity concerns. 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
 
Table 8 reports the multivariate regression results. Panel A uses the rating score to measure the dependent variable. 
Results indicate that pyramidal structure has a significant influence on the CSR reporting quality score mainly 
through the pyramidal layers. Regarding the key factor that influences CSR reporting quality, differences exists 
between SOFs and NSOFs. Specifically, the number of pyramidal layer is negatively related to the CSR reporting 
quality, particularly significant for the non-state-owned firms. H1a is supported. For the SOFs sample firms, the 
relation between pyramidal layer and CSR reporting quality is insignificant, as a result of the complexity of 
corporate governance in the state-owned firms. The divergence between control rights and ownership rights has a 
different effect on CSR reporting quality in the SOFs and NSOFs sample group. We use the ratio of ownership over 
control rights to measure the control-ownership rights separation. The lower the value of CO, the higher degree the 
separation between control rights and ownership rights is. Thus, the negative coefficient of CO variable in the state-
owned firm sub-samples means that the separation between control rights and ownership rights is significantly and 
positively related to the CSR reporting quality, supporting the hypothesis H2b. For non-state-owned firms, however, 
the relation between the CSR reporting quality and CO divergence is insignificant, and H2a is not supported. 
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 713 The Clute Institute 
Table 8. Multivariate regression results for the relation between pyramidal structure and CSR reporting quality 
Panel A: dependent variable – rating score 
Variables 







LAYER -1.001*** -3.021 -1.033** -2.141 -0.655 -1.399 
CO -2.186 -1.485 1.203 0.547 -5.102*** -2.409 
OWN 0.019 0.991 -0.012 -0.416 0.041 1.503 
SIZE 4.597*** 17.364 4.740*** 8.794 4.739*** 14.553 
ROA -3.221 0.609 -10.844 -1.325 -0.739 -0.105 
DEBT -9.143*** -4.660 -5.572* -1.761 -9.558*** -3.581 
REG -1.838** -2.511 -1.385 -1.120 -1.196 -1.198 
EXC -1.107* -1.703 -2.779** -2.511 0.237 0.277 
Y2012 2.869*** 4.135 1.935* 1.677 3.023*** 3.467 
Y2011 1.291* 1.828 0.227 0.196 1.757** 1.989 
INDj Control  Control  Control  
Adj.R2 0.295  0.258  0.297  
N 1338  454  934  
 
Panel B: dependent variable – rating rank 
Variables 







LAYER -0.248*** -2.678 -0.283** -2.053 -0.114 -0.883 
CO -0.727* -1.769 0.177 0.283 -1.511** -2.578 
OWN 0.004 0.775 -0.005 -0.629 0.009 1.177 
SIZE 1.253*** 16.957 1.345*** 8.746 1.283*** 14.240 
ROA -0.387 -0.262 -2.752 -1.178 0.669 0.345 
DEBT -2.495*** -4.555 -1.436* -1.591 -2.624*** -3.553 
REG -0.476** -2.330 -0.474 -1.344 -0.300 -1.087 
EXC -0.317* -1.746 -0.875*** -2.772 -0.008 -0.034 
Y2012 0.811*** 4.189 0.600* 1.823 0.805*** 3.335 
Y2011 0.265 1.344 -0.113 -0.343 0.424* 1.734 
INDj Control  Control  Control  
Adj.R2 0.294  0.264  0.293  
N 1338  454  934  
Note: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
We also take CSR reporting quality rating rank as the dependent variable to make regression and results are reported 
in Panel B of Table 8. Results of Panel B are basically consistent with those in Panel A except for the variable of the 
divergence between control rights and ownership rights in the full sample, which is marginally significant and 
negatively related to the CSR reporting rating rank.  
 
Most selected control variables show the same effect on CSR reporting quality in Panels A and B, by using CSR 
reporting quality score and rank as dependent variables respectively. Specially, firm size is significantly and 
positively related to the CSRR at the level of 1%, providing evidence that larger firms are more likely to disclose 
high-quality CSR reports. DEBT is significantly and negatively related to CSR reporting score in all models. Two 
disclosure period control variables are positively related to CSRR, indicating that the reporting quality increases 
over the sample period. As for the relationship between regulation and CSR reporting quality, both mandatory 
requirement and exchange are negatively related to the reporting quality in the full sample. In the sub-samples, 
however, only exchange is significantly negative in the non-state-owned firm sample, suggesting that regulation 
does not necessarily bring a good quality report. The coefficients of performance (ROA) are not significant in all 
models, suggesting that firm profitability is not an important factor on influencing CSR reporting quality. The 
control variable of ownership concentration, measured as the ownership percentage held by the controlling 
shareholder, does not have a significant influence on CSR reporting quality in general. 
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We also conduct the following robustness tests. First, we use the ownership rights held by the top ultimate owner to 
proxy the ownership concentration. Results are reported in Table 9, which are consistent with those in Table 8.  
 
Table 9. Regression results for tests of the relation between pyramidal structure and CSR reporting quality 
Panel A: dependent variable – rating score 







LAYER -0.975*** -2.959 -1.037** -2.172 -0.622 -1.333 
CO -2.510 -1.408 1.912 0.745 -6.391** -2.519 
OWN 0.014 0.638 -0.023 -0.638 0.038 1.316 
SIZE 4.624*** 17.423 4.736*** 8.894 4.754*** 14.533 
ROA -3.143 -0.594 -10.688 -0.061 -0.659 -0.094 
DEBT -9.214*** -4.691 -5.536* -1.749 -9.635*** -3.609 
REG -1.876** -2.562 -1.434 -1.168 -1.199 -1.200 
EXC -1.099* -1.687 -2.812** -2.538 0.221 0.258 
Y2012 2.854*** 4.113 1.948* 1.691 3.023*** 3.465 
Y2011 1.281* 1.813 0.241 0.209 1.759** 1.989 
INDj Control  Control  Control  
Adj.R2 0.294  0.259  0.296  
N 1338  454  934  
 
Panel B: dependent variable – rating rank 







LAYER -0.243*** -2.636 -0.289** -2.118 -0.108 -0.835 
CO -0.814 -1.637 0.356 0.487 -1.805** -2.572 
OWN 0.003 0.556 -0.007 -0.647 0.009 1.068 
SIZE 1.258*** 16.979 1.338*** 8.804 1.285*** 14.202 
ROA -0.371 -0.251 -2.740 -1.173 0.686 0.354 
DEBT -2.507*** -4.571 -1.429 -1.583 -2.637*** -3.569 
REG -0.483** -2.361 -0.470 -1.340 -0.300 -1.084 
EXC -0.316* -1.739 -0.879*** -2.779 -0.006 0.027 
Y2012 0.809*** 4.175 0.608* 1.849 0.805*** 3.335 
Y2011 0.263 1.334 -0.106 -0.322 0.425* 1.736 
INDj Control  Control  Control  
Adj.R2 0.293  0.264  0.292  
N 1338  454  934  
Note: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
Next, we replace ROA with ROCE (Return on Capital Employed) as the proxy for firms’ profitability, and use a 
dummy variable to represent the environment-sensitive industry. Environment-sensitive industry is defined 
according to the Guideline to Environmental Information Disclosure of Listed Firms issued by The Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) of China in September 2010. This document defines 16 industries, including 
industries such as textile, mining, and pharmacy etc. as environment-sensitive industries. In our sample, about 37% 
of sample firms fall into the environmental-sensitive profile. The multivariate regression results are also consistent 
with the prior findings.  
 
In addition, La Porta et al. (1999) argues that a firm’s ownership structure is pyramidal if (1) it has an ultimate 
owner, and (2) there is at least one publicly traded company between it and the ultimate owner in the chain of 20 
percent control right. We also use the final sample that excludes observations with C<20% and use the sub-sample 
that excludes both C<20% and C≥50% to make regression respectively, the results still hold.  
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 715 The Clute Institute 
Last, we also measure the control-ownership rights separation as the difference between the control rights and 
ownership rights held by the ultimate owner to replace the ratio of ownership rights over control rights, the results 
keep consistently.  
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The goal of this paper is to investigate the development of CSR reports in China, and the impact of corporate 
pyramidal structure on CSR reporting quality. The descriptive results indicate that the quality of CSR reporting of 
Chinese firms is still very low, but has been improved slowly over the sample period. Moreover, the state-owned 
firms provide CSR reporting with a higher quality than their peer non-state-owned firms, when measured by using 
either CSR reporting score or rating rank.  
 
In terms of the pyramidal structure, we find that the pyramidal structure has been widely employed by Chinese 
firms, with 97% of sample firms having 2 or more layers between the top ultimate owner and bottom firms. There 
are approximate 45% sample firms with CO ratio unequal to 1, suggesting that the separation of control right and 
ownership stake is not as serious as the pyramiding. Considering the political interference further, however, our 
results demonstrate that NSOFs are more likely to build pyramids with 3 or more layers, while SOFs are more likely 
to build pyramids with 2 layers. The separation of ownership and control is most pronounced among NSOFs. For the 
SOFs, there are nearly 33% state-owned firms separating their control rights from ownership, while 72% NSOFs 
separate their control rights from ownership effectively. 
 
Regarding the relationship between pyramidal structure and CSR reporting quality, we can draw the following 
conclusions. First, CSR reporting quality is negatively influenced by the pyramidal layer between the pyramidal top 
firm and bottom firm, suggesting that the less the pyramidal layer between the top ultimate owner and bottom firms, 
the better the CSR reporting quality. Second, regarding the relation between CSR reporting quality and the degree of 
divergence between control and ownership rights, results indicates a negative relation for the non-state-owned firms, 
but insignificant.  
 
In addition, we also find evidence on the political interference on the relationship between pyramidal structure and 
CSR reporting quality. The significant negative relationship between the number of pyramidal layers and CSR 
reporting quality disappears in the state-owned firms. And the insignificant effect of the separation of control rights 
and ownership on CSR reporting quality becomes significant. The separation of control rights and ownership is 
positively related to the CSR reporting quality for the state-owned firms, which can exert more pressure on 
corporate managers to report CSR through the excess of control right over ownership. This has public policy 
implications for China as well as a number of other countries in the Asia–Pacific region. 
 
It is necessary to acknowledge, however, that certain limitations exist. First, more empirical evidence is needed to 
test the relationship between pyramidal structure and CSR reporting. Although this paper provides some descriptive 
analysis on pyramidal structure and the development of CSR reporting in Chinese market, empirical test is 
inadequate. Second, the political interference only focuses on comparison between the state-owned firms and non-
state-owned firms. In order to observe the complete effect of political interference on the relationship, it would be 





Jianling Wang, Ph.D., is an associate professor in the School of Management at Xi’an Jiaotong University in 
China. Her main research interests include CSR information disclosure and financial reporting quality. E-mail: 
wangjl@mail.xjtu.edu.cn  
 
Min Zhou, is a doctorate student at Virginia Tech in U. S. A. His research interests include accounting information 
system and corporate social responsibility. E-mail: mizhou@vt.edu 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 716 The Clute Institute 
Lijun Lei, is a doctorate student at Virginia Tech in U.S.A. His research interests include accounting information 
system and corporate social responsibility. E-mail: llei1@vt.edu 
 
Weiguo Fan Ph. D., is an accounting professor at the Department of Accounting and Information Systems of 
Virginia Tech in U. S. A. His research interests include big data, corporate social responsibility and information 




Jianling Wang gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Natural Science Foundation Committee of China 





Aguilear R.V., Williams, C.A., Conley, J.M., & Ripp, D.E. (2006). Corporate governance and social responsibility: A 
comparative analysis of the UK and the US. Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility, 14(3): 147-158. 
Al-Tuwaijri, S.A., Christensen, T.E., & Hughes II., K.E. (2004). The relations among environmental disclosure, environmental 
performance, and economic performance: A simultaneous equations approach. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
29(5&6): 447-471. 
Buhr, N., & Freedman, M. (2001). Culture, institutional factors and differences in environmental disclosure between Canada and 
the United States. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 12(3): 293–322. 
Cadbury Code. (1992). Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance: The code of best practice, Gee 
Professional Publishing, London.  
Chau, G.K., & Gray, S.J. (2002). Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
International Journal of Accounting, 27: 247–265. 
China WTO Tribune. (2009). Four discoveries of the research on CSR reports in China from 2001 to 2009. [in Chinese]. 
http://www.wtoguide.net/Html/tbgz/061225155710689550912738279331.html 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L.H.P. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 58(1-2): 81-112. 
Cormier, D., & Magnan, M. (2003). Environmental reporting management: A continental European perspective. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 22(1): 43–62.  
Cormier, D., Magnan, M., & Velthoven, B. V.  (2005). Environmental disclosure quality in large German companies: Economic 
incentives, public pressures or institutional conditions? European Accounting Review, 14(1): 3–39. 
Cowen, S.S., Ferreri, L.B., & Parker, L.D. (1987). The impact of corporate characteristics on social responsibility disclosure: A 
typology and frequency-based analysis. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 12(2): 111-122. 
Dobbin, F., & Sutton, F.R. (1998). The strength of a weak state: the rights revolution and the rise of human resources 
management divisions. The American Journal of Sociology, 104(2): 441-476. 
Eurosif and ACCA. (2013). What do investors expect from non-financial reporting? http://www.eurosif.org Accessed January 29, 
2014. 
Faccio, M., & Lang, L.H.P. (2002) The ultimate ownership of western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 
65(3): 365-395. 
Fan, J.P.H., & Wong, T.J. (2002). Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3): 401-25. 
Fan, J. P.H., Wong, T.J., & Zhang, T. (2005). The emergence of corporate pyramids in China. SSRN working paper.  
Fan, J.P.H., Wong, T.J., & Zhang, T. (2007). Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance and post-IPO performance of 
China’s partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 84: 330-357.  
Fan, J.P.H., Wong, T.J., & Zhang, T.  (2012). Institutions and organizational structure: The case of state-owned corporate 
pyramids. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 29(6): 1217-1252.  
Ghazali, N.A.M. (2007). Ownership structure and corporate social responsibility disclosure: Some Malaysian evidence. 
Corporate Governance, 7(3): 251-266. 
Gray, R., Javad, M., Power D.M., &Sinclair, C.D. (2001). Social and environmental disclosure and corporate characteristics: A 
research note and extension. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 28(3&4): 327-356. 
Haniffa, R.M., & Cooke, T.E. (2005). The impact of culture and governance on corporate social reporting. Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy, 24(5):391–430. 
Hendarto, H.A., & Purwanto, B.M. (2012). Market reactions of mandatory implementation of corporate social responsibility: 
Indonesia context. Asia Pacific Management Review, 17(4): 379-402. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 717 The Clute Institute 
Holder-Webb, L., Cohen, J.R., Nath, L., & Wood, D. (2009). The supply of corporate social responsibility disclosures among 
U.S. firms. Journal of Business Ethics, 84(4): 497-527. 
KPMG International. (2014). The KPMG survey of corporate social responsibility reporting 2013. http: 
//www.kpmg.com/sustainability. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of Finance, 54(2): 
471-517. 
Li, W., & Zhang, R. (2010). Corporate social responsibility, ownership structure, and political interference: Evidence from 
China. Journal of Business, 96: 631-645.  
Li. H., & Zhang, Y. (2007). The role of managers’ political networking and functional experience in new venture performance: 
Evidence from China’s transition economy. Strategic Management Journal, 28(8): 791-804. 
Ma, D., & Parish, W.L. (2006). Tocquevillian moments: charitable contributions by Chinese private entrepreneurs. Social Forces, 
85(2): 943-964. 
Mahoney, L.S., Thorne, L., Cecil, L., & LaGore, W. (2013). A research note on standalone corporate social responsibility 
reports: signaling or greenwashing? Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 24(4-5): 350-359. 
Marquis, C., & Qian, C. (2014). Corporate social responsibility reporting in China: Symbol or Substance? Organization Science, 
25(1): 127-148. 
Roberts, R.W. (1992). Determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure: An application of stakeholder theory. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 17(6): 595–612. 
Wang, P., Wang, F., Zhang, J., & Yang, B. (2012). The effect of ultimate owner and regulation policy on corporate social 
responsibility information disclosure: Evidence from China. African Journal of Business Management, 6(20): 6183-
6193. 
Williamson, O.E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. The Free Press, New York. 
Zhu, S. (2006). The characteristics of ultimate shareholders and the informativeness of accounting earnings. China Accounting 
and Finance Review, 8(1): 25-49. 




The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 718 The Clute Institute 
NOTES 
